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Abstract 
 Are Latino students more likely to achieve at high levels when they are represented in 
school districts by members of their own race?  And, how does that representation affect the 
academic performance of non-Latino students?  This paper examines these questions through the 
lens of representative bureaucracy, as used in Meier & O’Toole’s (2006) study of Latino student 
achievement.  I define representation as the presence of Latino school board members and Latino 
teachers in a school district.  My analysis is a quantitative study of the 110 largest school districts 
in the United States, which extends Meier & O’Toole’s (2006) work in Texas by examining the 
relationship between Latino representation and Latino student achievement.  I extend their work 
in two ways: I expand the scope beyond Texas, by focusing on the 110 largest districts in the 
nation; and, I also consider the potential relationship between Latino representation and the 
achievement of non-Latino students.  Overall, the findings show that certain measures of student 
achievement are strongly related to the presence of Latino representation.  As the number of 
Latinos in US schools increases, it is critical to understand the factors affecting their academic 
performance. 
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Introduction 
 According the 2010 Census, Latinos1 make up 16.3 percent of the United States 
population.  Demographers predict that by 2020, one in every four children enrolled in US K-12 
public schools will be Latino (Maxwell 2012).  Latino students face many challenges that affect 
their educational achievement in particular, such as language barriers, poverty, and historically 
lower achievement as compared with other student racial subgroups.  There are 4 million Latino 
students in US public schools whose primary language is not English; about 75 percent of these 
students were born in the US (Rotherham 2011).  These students are considered English 
Language Learners (ELL). 
 As the number of Latino students in US public schools increases, the achievement gap 
between Latinos and white students affects more students than ever before.  A report issued by 
the US Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in June 2011 
shows that, between 1990 and 2011, the achievement gap between Latino and white students is 
largely unchanged, although scores for both groups have increased over time  (Webley 2011; 
Hemphill & Vanneman 2011, iv).  This gap is equal to about 20 points on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test, which substantively means that Latinos are 
nationally about two grades behind white students.  The NCES report shows an even greater 
achievement gap between ELL Latino students and whites (Webley 2011).  
 Along with relatively low student achievement, minorities are traditionally 
underrepresented in upper-level management and administration positions in the education 
sector.  NCES reports that 83 percent of public school teachers are white, 7 percent Latino, 7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will use Latino to mean anyone of a Spanish-speaking country descent. Whether he or she was born in 
the United States is irrelevant to my research. I could have used Hispanics instead, but will be consistent 
in my use of “Latino” throughout the paper. 
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percent black, 1 percent Asian, and 2 percent other (2010).  The US Census Bureau reports that 
57 percent of below post-secondary students are white, 21 percent Latino, 15 percent black, 4 
percent Asian, and 3 percent other (2012).  By comparing these two groups in Figure 1, we 
observe a large overrepresentation of white students, a 14 percent underrepresentation of Latinos, 
and similarly significant underrepresentation of other minority student groups.  Does this 
underrepresentation translate to lower achievement of minority students in schools?  These 
minority students have fewer racial representatives to act in their interests as compared with 
white students, who are often overrepresented in administrative positions proportional to the 
amount of students of that racial group. 
Figure 1. 
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 Many political scientists have studied how representation of a racial minority relates to 
student achievement of that minority group and have found that a high degree of association 
exists (First 1992; Meier 1993; Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard 1999; Meier & O’Toole 2006; Pitts 
2007; Rocha 2011).  Representation of a racial minority is often measured as the presence of 
members of that minority group.  In the education sector, representation could be measured as 
the percentage of members belonging to a racial minority group of school board members, 
teachers, or principals.  Student achievement can be measured as state exam scores, ACT or SAT 
scores, graduation rates, and many other ways.  My study will address the implications of such a 
strategy by considering the following research question: are Latino students more likely to 
achieve at high levels when they are represented in school districts by members of their own 
race? 
 After examining this question, I discuss the implications of my results with respect to 
their consequences on non-minority students.  For example, a Latino teacher might devote more 
one-on-one attention to Latino students and ignore non-Latino students because he identifies 
with Latino students or even is racist towards non-Latino students.  Just as one can focus on 
Latino student achievement, it is important to evaluate the effects and potential consequences of 
how improving one student group’s academic experience affects other student groups.  Therefore 
I will also consider the following question: how does representation of Latino students affect the 
academic performance of non-Latino students? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 This paper will consider student achievement through the lens of representative 
bureaucracy as used in Meier and O’Toole’s (2006, Chapter 4) study of Latino student 
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achievement.  Representative bureaucracy focuses on the translation of passive to active 
representation by considering when minority bureaucrats are likely to act in ways that benefit 
minority citizens (Meier & O’Toole 2006, 71).  Scholars have studied the effects of 
representation across a variety of sectors. 
  
Conceptualizing Representation and Representative Bureaucracy 
 Mosher (1982) and Pitkin (1967) set the groundwork for the theory of representative 
bureaucracy by contrasting two types of representation: passive and active.  In passive 
representation, individuals or administrators belong to the same social group as the represented 
(Mosher 1982, 15; Pitkin 1967, 89).  Origins in this case are defined as cultural experiences, 
native language, race, ethnicity, or gender.  An example of passive representation would be 
voting for a female candidate to serve on your local school board if you have school-aged 
daughters because you think that it is good for your daughters to see a female in a position of 
authority or that she would be a good role model. 
 In active representation, people are expected to act in the interests of those whom they 
represent through explicit actions that they expect to benefit that group of individuals (Mosher 
1982, 14; Pitkin 1967, 114-115).  For example, active representation would be voting for a 
female candidate to serve on your local school board if you have school-aged daughters because 
you expect that woman to fund after-school female leadership development programs that might 
specifically benefit your daughters.  Or, you could vote for a male candidate who has stated in 
his platform that he would create the same type of leadership program for girls.  The latter is an 
example of active representation without passive representation. 
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 Pitkin (1967, 209) studied these two types of representation in the context of legislative 
bodies and politics, finding that descriptive representation usually leads to substantive 
representation in political life in the United States.  This means specifically that electing a 
congressman to office usually results in that constituency being represented, such as having 
programs funded that affect the locality, since that congressman is a resident of that same 
locality.  In this example, the congressman’s town or area of residence is passive representation 
and the funded programs that affect the area are active representation. 
 Another way to distinguish the two types is to consider passive representation as a 
characteristic and active representation as a process (Meier 1993).  These two types of 
representation can work together to produce outcomes that benefit a given minority or majority 
of the population.  Pitkin’s (1967) work about representation in the context of politics has been 
built upon and extended to include representation within the public and education sectors, which 
is most pertinent to the research in this paper.  
 Applying Pitkin’s work to the education sector and the case of Latino student 
achievement, we could imagine passive representation to be the mere presence of Latino school 
board members and teachers and active representation could take many other forms.  For 
example, active representation of Latino students at the school-board-level could be opting to 
fund more ELL programs or hire more Latino teachers or principals.  At the teacher or classroom 
level, active representation might be additional attention or help that a Latino teacher gives to a 
Latino student.  According to Meier & O’Toole’s (1993; 2006) description of representative 
bureaucracy, the representative bureaucrat in question must have the discretion to act in ways 
that benefit the represented.  Especially at the micro-level, we can imagine a high level of 
 8 
discretion given to these representative bureaucrats.  Therefore, the theory of representative 
bureaucracy should apply to my study. 
 Scholars have argued that the theory of representative bureaucracy describes the 
translation of passive to active representation (Pitkin 1967; Mosher 1982; Meier 1993; Meier & 
O’Toole 2006).  The literature suggests that passive representation is linked to active 
representation when both the demographic characteristic is highly salient, such as race, and the 
bureaucrats have discretion to act (Meier & O’Toole 1993, 393-394).  Therefore, we can 
hypothesize that passive representation—as measured by the presence of Latino school board 
members—might translate to active representation.  Where Latinos sit on the school board, this 
active representation could be demonstrated as higher levels of Latino student achievement for 
some measures. 
 When considering the theory of representative bureaucracy in this context, the questions 
we should ask first are the following: in what scenarios can minority bureaucrats exercise enough 
discretion that their actions benefit minority citizens?  And, to what extent do the minority 
citizens actually benefit from this representation? 
 
Representative Bureaucracy in Action 
 There are several studies that investigate representative bureaucracy, as defined by 
Mosher (1982) and Pitkin (1967), and student achievement of Latinos and other minority groups, 
on which I will base my research.  Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999, 1030) identified three 
reasons why minority teachers can lead to better outcomes for minority students: (1) they are 
better at educating minority students; (2) they can serve as role models; and, (3) they can 
alleviate the negative consequences of grouping, tracking, and discipline.  The authors apply the 
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theory of representative bureaucracy to school districts in Texas and find that Latino student 
achievement is most likely to improve when there is a critical mass of Latino administrators 
present in the organization.  Specifically, Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999, 1030) find that a 
1.0 percentage point increase in minority teachers is associated with a .0614 percentage point 
increase in the minority student exam pass rate.  Given that this is a small substantive effect, the 
conclusion of this study is that representative bureaucracy can be offered as a partial solution for 
reconciling the conflict between democracy and administration (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard 
1999, 1036).  Because many of their control variables were statistically significant2, 
representative bureaucracy was not the only factor at play. 
 The measure of Latino administrators can be measured as the presence of Latino school 
board members.  Administrators typically have less personal interaction and discretion with 
individual agents than lower-level bureaucrats, such as teachers, so therefore the presence of 
school board members is an appropriate measure of administrative representation.  First studied 
the effect of school boards on student achievement and concluded that school boards must look 
beyond their traditional concerns to serve low-income, minority students (1992, 190).  School 
boards must attend to appropriate curricula, teaching strategies, educational standards, teacher 
expectations for student performance, and basic instructional and student support services for 
these students, or they are likely to fail to improve minority achievement (First 1992, 190). 
 Much of the representative bureaucracy literature uses teachers as the measure of 
representatives or bureaucrats, as they are thought to be able to exercise more discretion than 
bureaucrats farther away from the classroom, such as school board members or superintendents.  
Since these previous works use the theory of representative bureaucracy to analyze student 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard (1999) control for poverty, educational policies, and the resources of a 
school; all of these measures are statistically significant. 
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outcomes and find that it partially explains the relationship between minority representation and 
minority student achievement, I will also include the percentage of Latino teachers in the school 
district in my research. 
 Meier (1993) examined the ability of Latino teachers and principals to serve as active 
representatives for Latino students using a dozen school districts in Florida.  He found that 
Latino teachers serve as better representatives than principals for Latino students for nine 
different measures, including: (1) Latinos enrolling in gifted classes, (2) receiving corporal 
punishment, (3) receiving out-of-school suspensions, (4) learning in alterative education classes, 
(5) being expelled, (6) passing the communications test, (7) passing the math test, (8) not being 
promoted to the next grade, and (9) dropping out of school (Meier 1993, 405).  For all of these 
listed measures, the percentage of teachers who were Latino was more highly correlated with 
whether or not the school was headed by a Latino principal.  This demonstrates the greater 
impact of street-level bureaucrats. 
 I will use the presence of Latino teachers as a barometer of minority presence in school 
districts in addition to the presence of Latino school board members.  Meier, Wrinkle, and 
Polinard (1999), Meier and O’Toole (2006), and Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-
Crotty (2011) all use minority, or Latino, teachers to measure passive representation in their 
studies. 
 The theory of representative bureaucracy has evolved slightly over time.  This evolution 
can easily be seen in Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) work.  The two authors assert that 
representative bureaucracy is based on three assumptions: (1) bureaucrats exercise discretion (2) 
given discretion, bureaucrats seek to maximize their own policy values within the range of 
possibilities, and (3) values are formed from socialization experiences—or, that origins play a 
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role (Meier & O’Toole 2006, 71-72).  Meier and O’Toole studied 1,043 public school districts in 
Texas to see the effect of Latino school board members and teachers on Latino student 
achievement and found that the influence of bureaucracy overwhelms that of school board 
members on a wide range of performance measures (2006, Chapter 4).  The two scholars found 
statistically significant coefficient values between the percentage of Latino teachers and a variety 
of student outcomes, including Latino students’ state exam pass rate, daily school attendance, 
drop out rate, enrollment in advanced classes, and AP exam pass rate (Meier & O’Toole 2006, 
82).  
 My research builds upon this study, as I will use their definitions of representative 
bureaucracy and student achievement in a similar context.  I move this research ahead by 
analyzing different school districts and using more recent data.  As per Meier and O’Toole’s 
study (2006), I will use the definition of passive representation to operationalize Latino 
representation; therefore, both the presence of Latinos on the school board and as teachers may 
influence policies in the school district that might benefit Latino students and, in turn, these 
policies can lead to changes in achievement among Latino students. 
 
Unintended Consequences of Representative Bureaucracy 
 The effects of representative bureaucracy of minorities are not always ideal, however.  
Even if minority students are positively affected by the presence of minority teachers and 
administrators, other student groups may be negatively impacted.  Pitts (2007) also uses the lens 
of representative bureaucracy to evaluate the organizational performance of schools.  He 
concludes that Latino and African-American students benefit from teachers and school board 
members who are their respective race.  What distinguishes Pitts from other scholars who 
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organize their work using the theory of representative bureaucracy is his focus on white student 
achievement.  One of his hypotheses is that higher ethnic representation among bureaucrats at 
both the managerial and street levels will lead to more positive target population outcomes for 
people of color than for whites (Pitts 2007, 518).  Pitts (2007, 501) conjectures that there might 
be an element of racism involved that would depress levels of white student achievement, as 
Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, and Walker (2005) found3.  Pitts finds an interesting result 
related to white student achievement: white students not only respond less positively to 
representation than Latino and African-American students, but there is also a negative 
relationship between ethnic representation and white student performance (2007, 518).  
According to Pitts’s (2007) findings, white students should respond negatively to teacher 
representation of black and Latino students.  
 Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) also pose a question regarding representative 
bureaucracy’s effect on non-minority citizens.  They discuss how policy outcomes are often 
perceived as a zero-sum game in which the gains of one group, higher achievement of minority 
students in this case, will be counterbalanced by losses from another, lower student achievement 
of white students (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard 1999, 1026).  The authors find that for their 
sample of all students, a 1.0 percentage point increase in minority teachers is associated with a 
drop of .1113 points in the pass rate of all students (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard 1999, 1030); 
given that a 1.0 percentage point increase in minority teachers is associated with a positive 
increase in the Latino-student pass rate, this relationship is worrisome because it implies that 
more minority teachers lead to worse student performance for non-minority students. 
 Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) also investigate the zero-sum  
theory by analyzing 1,200 elementary school districts from a national sample.  Their measure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this study, citizen satisfaction was the measure of performance, not student achievement. 
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active representation is participation in Gifted & Talented programs.  They hypothesized that 
with an increased percentage of minority—Latino and black—teachers, there would be lower 
non-minority student participation in Gifted & Talented programs (Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, 
& Nicholson-Crotty 2011, 589).  They found that gain for one student subgroup was indeed at 
the expense of other student subgroups, if won through bureaucratic partiality.  Specifically for 
Latinos, more Latino teachers were associated with fewer white students being assigned to 
Gifted & Talented programs, but only in those schools where whites were already 
overrepresented; Hispanic teachers had no statistically significant effect on the percentage of 
students in the programs who were black (Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, & Nicholson-Crotty 2011, 
592).  These scholars not only find that passive representation is translated to active 
representation, but that having more Hispanic teachers in a school can actually negatively affect 
white students. 
 Mosher (1982), introduced before as one of the first scholars to think about the theory of 
representative bureaucracy, has similar concerns as Pitts (2007), Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 
(1999), and Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty (2011).  Mosher generalizes his 
concerns to democracy in general: “It may be noted that active representativeness run rampant 
within a bureaucracy would constitute a major threat to orderly democratic government. The 
summing up of the multitude of special interests seeking effective representation does not 
constitute the general interest” (1982, 15).  Mosher is concerned with representation of the 
majority group if representation of minority groups is to be emphasized within a bureaucratic 
state (1982, 229).  I will therefore also investigate the effect of Latino representation on white 
student achievement by asking the following question: how does the representation of Latino 
students affect white student achievement? 
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Data and Methods 
 I collected data from the 110 largest school districts in the nation.  The data for all of the 
dependent and most of the independent variables are originally from State Board of Education 
and State Education Agency websites’ No Child Left Behind district report cards for the 2010-
2011 school year.  One of the main independent variables of interest, the percentage of Latino 
school board members at the district level, came from the 2011 Latino Directory from the 
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials.  For this quantitative analysis, I 
will use the method of ordinary least squares regression.  I chose to use the 110 largest school 
districts for three key reasons: (1) Latinos tend to live in urban areas4; (2) looking at the largest 
school districts in the United States should be a sample whose results can be generalized and 
applied to large school districts opposed to just a specific state or region; and (3) the largest 
school districts have the most accessible websites for data collection5. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 In this analysis, all dependent variables will be measures of student achievement.  The 
most commonly used measure of student achievement is state exam standardized test scores, but 
as this is an analysis of the 110 largest school districts coming from many states across the 
nation, the measure cannot be used exactly as is.  Since the passage of No Child Left Behind in 
2001, each state has the right and responsibility to create its own state exams and standards to 
measure student achievement.  I cannot simply use raw state exam scores because one state may 
use a scale of 1-1000 while another uses 0-250.  Instead, the percentages of students passing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Over 75% of Latinos in the US live in 60 of the largest Hispanic metropolitan areas, according to an 
analysis of Census Bureau data by the Pew Hispanic Center (Motel & Patten 2012). 
5 Wong, Shen, Anagnostopoulos, and Rutledge (2007, Chapter 3) use a similar sample size of 104 school 
districts based on five decision rules in their study of mayoral leadership as education reform policy. 
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(proficient or advanced) the state exam will be one measure of student achievement that is 
comparable across all districts.  However, these exams and standards vary greatly from state to 
state, so using the percentage of students passing the exam does not suffice, and I therefore use 
an additional control, which is discussed in the next section.  Specifically, the measures used are 
the percentages of students that pass the state exams, broken down by race, for grades 3-8, 
reading and mathematics. 
 Since state exam scores are only one measure of student achievement, I will use other 
dependent that measure both primary and secondary school achievement.  Pitts (2007) uses 
student performance indicators such as state exam score, SAT score, and dropout rate as the 
dependent variables in his analysis.  Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) measured student 
performance as the percentage of students passing the Texas state exam in multiple subject areas.  
I go beyond prior studies to robustly test the hypotheses using several dependent variables. 
 In order to measure high school academic achievement, three additional measures are 
used in my analysis: dropout rate (%), high school graduation rate (%), and ACT or SAT scores6. 
All four measures of student achievement are broken down by race: Latino and white student 
sub-scores. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The first main independent variable of interest is the presence of Latino members on a 
district-level school board.  This variable is measured as the percentage of Latinos out of total 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Some states only report SAT scores, while others only report ACT scores.  Since about 2/3rds of states 
report SAT instead of ACT scores, I will be using the following linear transformation to convert ACT 
scores to SAT score equivalents, as suggested by Wainer (1986):
€ 
SAT = 40
€ 
ACT  +110. 
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school board members.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of the independent variable, where the 
large majority of school districts in the sample had zero percent Latino school board members7. 
Figure 2. 
  
 Meier et al. (1999) measure street-level bureaucrats, or teachers, by using the percentage 
of Latino teachers as well.  In Meier’s (1993) study, the independent variables used to measure 
Latino representation are the percentage of Latino teachers and percentage of Latino principals in 
a school district.  Pitts (2007) takes a different approach to measuring manager and teacher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Out of 110 school districts, 1 district had 7 Latino school board members; 3 districts had 5; 2 districts 
had 4; 2 districts had 3; 10 districts had 2; 16 districts had 1; and 76 districts had 0. 
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representation, in which he has two separate variables for each level of representation, which 
yield scores ranging from zero to one where zero equals that the organization has a perfect 
mismatch and one equals a perfect match between ethnicity of the manager or teacher and 
ethnicity in the target population.  Although Pitts presents a unique way of measuring 
representation, I will approach the representation variable the most common way: through the 
percentage represented.  Therefore, my two independent variables measuring representation will 
be the percentage of school board members who are Latino and the percentage teachers who are 
Latino8. 
 When examining the relationship between my dependent and independent variables, it is 
important to control for other independent variables that could be accounting for or contributing 
to the relationship.  I will control for NCES’s NAEP-equivalent proficiency cut score levels9 to 
account for the variation in differences in exam difficulty and proficiency standards across states.  
Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) assert that it is critical to control for poverty, the resources 
of a given school district, and educational policies. They equate a poverty measure to the 
percentage of students who qualify for free or reduced-price meals in the school lunch program; I 
will use this measure as a control for poverty as well.  Average teacher salary, student-to-teacher 
ratio, and teacher experience accounts for a school districts resources in their model; I will use 
student-to-teacher ratio as a control independent variable10. 
 The other control independent variables I will include are the percentage of Latino 
students in the given school district and the related white student achievement measure.  Many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 64 out of the 110 school districts have Latino teachers. 
9 NAEP’s cut score levels are for 4th and 8th grades only and for both mathematics and reading.  I will use 
the 4th grade ratings for 3rd-5th grades (elementary school) and the 8th grade rating for 6th-8th grades 
(middle school).  In most models, the NAEP variable is statistically significant. 
10 I only use student-to-teacher ratio because this measure was available for all 110 districts whereas other 
measures were not. 
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scholars control for the former variable when looking at the achievement of minority students 
following the logic that minority student achievement will be biased to be higher if there are 
more minority students in the school; or, that camaraderie exists among minority students.  Also, 
this control will allow me to distinguish between the effects of Latino representation over and 
above the mere presence of a large Latino population.  Scholars control for white student 
achievement to ensure that Latino school board members and teachers affect Latino student 
achievement over and above the impact that they might have on white students (Meier & 
O’Toole 2006, 80).  In addition, I will control for Latino student achievement in the white 
student models for this same reason. 
 
Hypotheses 
 My hypotheses are grounded in the previous research of Meier and O’Toole (2006), 
Meier (1993), as well as Pitts (2007) and will consider whether representation is associated with 
Latino student achievement of higher levels.  As explained before, I will measure Latino student 
achievement with high school graduation rate, dropout rate, state exam scores, and SAT and 
ACT scores (see footnote 6).   
 The first hypothesis uses the most common application of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy as demonstrated in the previous examples: 
 H1: The presence of Latino school board members is positively associated with   
  Latino student achievement. 
 This hypothesis is a straightforward replication and extension of Meier and O’Toole’s 
(2006) research. 
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 My second hypothesis is an extension of the theory of representative bureaucracy, such as 
in Pitts’s (2007) research.  Mosher notes that representation of one group may affect the 
majority’s “general interest” (1982, 15).  Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard discuss the “zero-sum 
problem,” that is that the gains of one group must be compensated for with losses from another 
(1999, 1026). Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) research how Latino and 
African-American representation in schools affects other student subgroups’ achievement and 
find that in a zero-sum context, gains for the two minority groups won through bureaucratic 
representation do come at the expense of other groups (594).  I will be extending the research of 
Meier and O’Toole (2006) by also considering the potential relationship between Latino 
representation and the achievement of white students. 
 In considering the zero-sum problem in the context of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, I would expect to find that Latino representation has negative consequences as well 
as the positive ones in H1.  Therefore, my second hypothesis is: 
 H2: The presence of Latino school board members is negatively associated with   
 white student achievement. 
 Meier and O’Toole (2006, 84) found that when they added street-level bureaucratic 
representation, or the percentage of Latino teachers, the effect of Latino school board members 
on Latino student achievement diminishes significantly.  Intuitively, it makes sense that the 
teachers, who come into regular and direct contact with the students and have more discretion to 
act, could have a greater effect on student outcomes than school board members, who mostly 
have indirect interactions with students by advocating for funding for special programs (such as 
ELL) or through their hiring practices.  Either the presence of Latino school board members 
results in the hiring of and presence of Latino teachers, which is related to high levels of Latino 
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student achievement, or both the presence of Latino school board members and Latino teachers 
affect Latino student outcomes.  I hypothesize that: 
 H3: The presence of Latino teachers is positively associated with Latino student   
  achievement and diminishes the effect of Latino school board members’ presence. 
 Similarly, I extend Meier & O’Toole’s (2006) work by considering the zero-sum problem 
discussed by Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) in the context of representative bureaucracy.  I 
once again expect to find that Latino representation, of teachers and school board members, has 
negative consequences for non-Latino students.  Finally, my last hypothesis is: 
 H4: The presence of Latino teachers is negatively associated with white student   
  achievement and diminishes the effect of Latino school board members’ presence. 
 
Results 
 Before assessing the specific hypotheses, I will look at the bivariate relationships 
between the dependent variables and the main independent variables of interest—the percentage 
of Latino school board members and the percentage of Latino teachers.  Figure 3 presents the 
regression slope coefficients for the measures of Latino student achievement for the Latino 
school board members model, and Figure 4 presents the coefficients for the measures of student 
achievement for the Latino teachers model.  As we can observe in Figure 3, there are positive 
regression slope coefficients for all dependent variables except two: the percentage of students 
passing sixth grade reading and eighth grade math.  These two negative coefficients are not 
particularly problematic because they are not statistically significant.  Looking at Figure 4, we 
observe that not only are all fourteen regression slope coefficients positive, but eight are also 
statistically significant.  This substantively means that at the simplest level, as the percentage of 
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Latino representation increases, a higher percentage of Latino students pass a given exam, or 
graduate, or fewer drop out.  These figures provide evidence for my first hypothesis (H1) and 
suggest that H3 might be supported as well. 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 4. 
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 Figures 5 and 6 are similar to Figures 3 and 4, except in that they show white student 
performance instead of Latino.  Figure 5 resembles Figure 3 in that all but two regression slope 
coefficients are positive and none are significant, except that the coefficient values are smaller 
across-the-board.  Figure 6 also resembles Figure 4, except that there is one measure of white 
student achievement that has a negative regression slope coefficient and only three out of 
fourteen measures are significant, as opposed to eight in the Latino model.  Substantively, it 
appears that Latino representation has little-to-no effect on white student achievement.  
Therefore, these figures do not support H2.  To see if H3 and H4 are supported, I now evaluate a 
slightly more complex model, with the dependent variables and both Latino representation 
variables.  
Figure 5.  
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Figure 6.  
 
 Table 1A presents the OLS regression models for Latino student exam scores in grades 3 
through 8 for math and reading including both main independent variables of interest11.  For 
most of these models, the percentage of Latino teachers is statistically significant, and for some, 
the percentage of Latino school board members is statistically significant.  Interestingly, the 
coefficients for these two variables are different; for Latino teachers, there is a positive 
association between their presence and Latino student achievement whereas for Latino board 
members, there is actually a negative association between their presence and Latino student 
achievement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As we can see in Tables 1A and 1B as well as other following tables, the total number of cases equals a 
maximum of 64, not 110, when accounting for Latino teachers in a school district.  There was only 
teacher demographic data available for these 64 school districts, which could potentially result in an even 
fewer percentage of school districts having any Latino board members at all. However, this is not the 
case. In Figure 2 and Footnote 7, I show that approximately 29% of school districts, out of the 110 cases, 
have more than 0% of school board members who are Latino. Out of these 64 cases that have Latino 
teacher data available, 41% have Latinos on their school board; therefore, the board representation 
variable is no more problematic than in was before for this reduced sample of districts. 
 24 
 For almost all of the models, the coefficient for the Latino teachers variable is much 
larger than the coefficient for the Latino school board members variable, suggesting that Latino 
teachers have a greater impact on Latino student achievement than Latino school board 
members.  This generally supports my third hypothesis (H3) because the effect of Latino 
teachers essentially cancels out the effect of Latino school board members’ presence and 
additionally still has a positive association with Latino student achievement on state exam scores. 
But how do we reconcile this negative association between Latino school board members and 
Latino student achievement when in Figure 3, we saw the exact opposite?  The Latino school 
board members and Latino teachers variables are highly correlated: value of .8163.  The Latino 
teachers variable must be picking up and covering the negative effect of Latino school board 
members when Latino teachers are not in the model, as in Figure 3.  This high correlation also 
suggests that a higher percentage of either Latino board members or teachers is associated with 
an increase in the other. 
 Table 1B presents the regression models for white student exam scores in grades 3 
through 8 for both math and reading, using both the percentage Latino school board members 
and teachers as independent variables.  Just like in the Latino version of this model, the 
percentage of Latino teachers is significant is most models and the percentage of Latino school 
board members is significant in some models.  Also similarly, the coefficients for board 
members are negative and for teachers are positive.  Unlike the Latino model, the difference 
between the coefficients is much smaller.  The data demonstrate that the presence of Latino 
board members and teachers is having a small positive to no effect on white student 
achievement.  This evidence suggests that H4 is not supported because the presence of Latino 
board members and teachers is not negatively associated with white student achievement.  To 
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investigate my hypotheses further, I now add in the control variables I discussed in the methods 
section.
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 Table 2 (A models) presents the regression model for the 4-year high school graduation 
rate of Latino and white students with the Latino board variable as the only measure of 
representation.  Although the control variables are not the main focus, a few of them are very 
significant for both regression models, as they help us to understand variation in the dependent 
variable.  For the Latino student model, we observe a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the student-to-teacher ratio and graduation rate.  This means that as the 
student-to-teacher ratio increases, or as a school district’s resources diminish, fewer Latinos 
graduate from high school.  Also, there is a positive, statistically significant association between 
white graduation rate and Latino graduation rate, in both directions.  As more Latino students 
graduate, more white students do as well; also, a higher white graduation rate is associated with a 
higher Latino graduation rate. 
 For the white student model, we see a statistically significant and negative relationship 
between the poverty rate, or the percentage of students receiving a free or reduced-price lunch, 
and graduation rate.  This means that more impoverished students in a district is associated with 
a lower white graduation rate.  In addition, there is a positive, statistically significant association 
between the percentage of Latino students and white graduation rate.  Substantively, this means 
that more Latino students in a school district is associated with a higher white graduation rate.  
This might be the case due to camaraderie or strong group identification that empowers Latino 
students to be more successful when their racially and ethnically similar peers surround them. 
 The most interesting relationship to observe is the association between the percentage of 
Latino school board members and the Latino and white graduation rates.  In Table 2 (A model), a 
1-percentage increase in Latino school board members is associated with an increase of 13.3 
percentage in the Latino graduation rate, holding all other variables constant.  It is important to 
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note that although the Latino school board members variable is not technically statistically 
significant in the Latino graduation rate model, the p-value is 0.120, which explains why this 
variable nonetheless has a substantial relationship with the Latino graduation rate.  These data 
support H1.  
 In the white graduation rate model, we observe that the Latino school board member 
variable is statistically significant and negatively associated with the white student graduation 
rate.  A 1-percentage increase in Latino school board members is associated with a decrease of 
14.52 percent in the white graduation rate, holding all other variables constant.  Therefore, H2 is 
also supported.  
 I now evaluate similar regression models to that of Table 2’s A models, but with the 
addition of a key independent variable: the percentage of Latino teachers in the school district.  
The same control independent variables that were significant in the previous model without 
teachers are still statistically significant and associated with the dependent variable in the same, 
either positive or negative, way.  If we look to Table 2 (B models) at the associations between 
the Latino graduation rate and the two Latino representation variables, we observe interesting 
changes.  Unlike the previous model, the coefficient of the Latino board members variable is 
negative, although it is not close to being statistically significant.  The Latino teachers coefficient 
is positive, much larger than the board members’ coefficient, and has a proportionally smaller 
standard error.  Therefore, it appears that the positive association between Latino board members 
and the Latino graduation rate shown in Table 2 (B model) is likely caused more by the presence 
of Latino teachers than by Latino school board members. H3 is therefore somewhat supported12. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 H3 would be fully supported if either of the two Latino representation variables were statistically 
significant, but this is not the case.	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 In Table 2’s white graduation rate B model, the relationship with Latino school board 
members is no longer significant, although the coefficient is a larger negative number.  The 
relationship with Latino teachers is not significant either and the coefficient is positive. 
Therefore, H4 is not supported because the effect of Latino teachers’ presence is smaller than the 
effect of Latino school board members’ presence.  
Table 2. The relationship between Latino representation and graduation rates
Dependent Variables: Percentage of  students who:
Independent variables
Latino      
Graduate HS     
A
White       
Graduate HS     
A
Latino      
Graduate HS    
B
White       
Graduate HS   
B
     Latino school board members (%) 13.30 -14.52** -0.872 -16.17
(8.466) (6.825) (13.93) (12.67)
     Latino teachers (%) 5.748 2.014
(13.34) (12.38)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) 0.000664 -0.241*** -0.0200 -0.216***
(0.0657) (0.0461) (0.0833) (0.0700)
     Student-to-teacher ratio -0.637* -0.120 0.422 -0.829
(0.382) (0.317) (1.027) (0.945)
     Latino students (%) -5.734 14.87*** 6.489 15.32*
(6.773) (5.292) (9.419) (8.463)
     White or Latino students who graduate (%) 0.779*** 0.519*** 0.634*** 0.544***
(0.108) (0.0718) (0.132) (0.113)
     (Constant) 17.30 56.45*** 9.074 63.61***
(13.87) (9.457) (20.71) (16.67)
Adjusted R-squared 0.541 0.653 0.483 0.563
N 83 83 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The last control variable, White or Latino students who graduate, controls for the opposite student group’s 
achievement for the same measure. So for the Latino model, the control is white achievement and for the white model, the 
control is Latino achievement. This is also true for Tables 3, 6, 7, 8, and 11.  
 Now, I turn to a related high school achievement measure to see if the above findings 
remain the same.  Table 3 (A models) presents the regression model for high school dropout rate 
for both Latino and white students.  Two of the control independent variables are statistically 
significant for both Latino and white models.  The percent of impoverished students is negatively 
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associated with the Latino dropout rate, implying that with more students in poverty in a school, 
fewer Latino students drop out of high school.  The coefficient for this variable in the white 
model is positive which suggests that with more impoverished students, more white students 
drop out.  The other statistically significant control variable is white or Latino dropout rate 
(white for the Latino model and Latino for the white model).  I find that with more white 
students dropping out, more Latino students drop out, and vice versa.  
 The Latino school board representation variable is not significant for either the Latino or 
the white model (A models).  Although this variable is not statistically significant (p=0.134) in 
the white dropout rate model (H2), the relatively low p-value indicates that there is a 
substantially significant relationship between this variable and the white dropout rate.  A 1-
percentage increase in Latino school board members is associated with an increase of 3.84 
percent in the white dropout rate, holding all other variables constant.  The signs of the 
coefficients for this variable are what I predicted in H1 and H2: negative for the Latino student 
model and positive for the white student model. Although statistically insignificant, I find 
suggestive evidence to support H1 and H2 given that with a higher Latino board membership 
rate, we would expect to see a lower Latino dropout rate and higher white dropout rate.  
 Table 3, B models, shows a similar regression model as in the A models, but with the 
percentage of Latino teachers in the school district added into the model.  There are key 
similarities but also interesting differences in these two models.  The percentage of impoverished 
students is no longer statistically significant, but the percentage of Latino/white students who 
drop out is still associated in the same way with each dependent variable.  
 The Latino school board representation remains insignificant, but with the same direction 
(positive or negative) of the coefficients.  The Latino teacher variable is very statistically 
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insignificant, and surprisingly has opposite coefficient signs than the Latino school board 
variable for each model.  However, the coefficients of the Latino teacher variable are much 
smaller compared to the board members’ coefficients.  This suggests that there is no evidence for 
H3 and H4, since Latino school board members’ presence has a greater, yet very small, 
association with the drop out rate than the presence of Latino teachers.  
Table 3. The relationship between Latino representation and dropout rates
Dependent Variables: Percentage of  students who:
Independent variables
Latino Dropout 
A
White Dropout 
A
Latino Dropout 
B
White Dropout 
B
     Latino school board members (%) -1.897 3.844 -1.858 3.514
(2.930) (2.537) (2.293) (2.560)
     Latino teachers (%) 0.458 -1.125
(2.370) (2.673)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) -0.0320* 0.0555*** 0.00919 0.00496
(0.0192) (0.0159) (0.0139) (0.0158)
     Student-to-teacher ratio 0.0861 -0.0617 0.0340 -0.0493
(0.0872) (0.0766) (0.0598) (0.0674)
     Latino students (%) -1.667 -1.858 -0.333 -0.894
(2.487) (2.175) (1.723) (1.943)
     White or Latino students who drop out (%) 0.919*** 0.706*** 0.816*** 1.041***
(0.0776) (0.0596) (0.0486) (0.0620)
     (Constant) 3.124* -2.000 0.843 -0.577
(1.839) (1.626) (1.316) (1.490)
Adjusted R-squared 0.665 0.689 0.860 0.861
N 82 82 57 57
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 I now analyze state exam scores as the measure of achievement.  Table 4A presents the 
multiple regression models for the percentage of Latino students who pass the state exams in 
grades 3 through 8 for both math and reading.  I would expect to observe positive associations 
between the percentage of Latino school board members and these various exams given the 
results displayed in Figure 313, but instead the regression slope coefficient for this main variable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Figure 3 is discussed on page 21. 
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of interest is negative and statistically insignificant in every model without exception.  Therefore 
H1 is not supported at all by these data. 
 All of the control variables included in the models are statistically significant for almost 
every model.  In general, having more impoverished students in a school district is associated 
with a lower percentage of Latinos passing the state exam.  Also, having a lower student-to-
teacher ratio is associated with higher Latino achievement on the exams.  As we observed in 
other dependent variables measuring student achievement, when white students achieve at higher 
levels, so do Latinos.  NCES’s NAEP-equivalent proficiency cut scores, with higher values 
indicating more difficult state exams or standards, has a negative association with Latino 
achievement, which presents a somewhat puzzling situation.  As the NAEP score increases, 
fewer Latino students pass their state exam.  This might suggest an underlying inequality in state 
exams14. 
 By far, the most statistically significant variable that also has large coefficients is the 
percentage of Latino students in a school district.  There is a strong and positive association 
between this percentage and the percentage of Latino students who pass the various state exams. 
Although there is not evidence to support H1, the Latino board representation variable and 
Latino student variable are strongly correlated, with a correlation value of .7996, so I suspect that 
if I removed this variable from the model, H1 would be supported15. 
 Looking at Table 4B we find that H2 is partially, although weakly, supported.  For nine 
out of the twelve exam pass rates, there is a negative association with the percentage of Latino 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I am not going to attempt to discuss inequalities that may or may not exist in the very structure or 
content of state exams. 
15 When I tested to see if removing the percentage of Latino students variable from the model, I did in fact 
find that the sign of the coefficient for the Latino board representation variable changed to positive—in 
support of H1—and was statistically significant in nine out of the twelve models.  In fact, the adjusted r-
squared values for these models were slightly (about .1) higher than those in Table 4A.  I discuss this 
finding later in the paper. 
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school board members.  However, this variable is only statistically significant in one model—
sixth grade math.  Unlike the Latino version of these models, there is only one control variable 
that is consistently statistically significant: the percentage of Latino students who pass the given 
exam.  As mentioned above, this generally holds up over several measures of student 
achievement, with both higher Latino student achievement being associated with higher white 
student achievement and visa versa. 
 Table 5A presents the same regression models from Table 4A, but with the percentage of 
Latino teachers variable included.  The student-to-teacher ratio, percentage of Latino students, 
NAEP score, and the percentage white students who pass the exam control variables are all 
statistically significant and associated with the dependent variables, the various state exam pass 
rates for Latinos, in the same substantive way as in Table 4A’s models.  As we observed before 
in the Latino models of the B models of Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients of the Latino board 
representation variable are negative while the coefficients of the Latino teacher variable are 
positive.  However, neither of these variables is statistically significantly associated with Latino 
state exam scores.  Therefore H3 only has partial and weak support. 
 Table 5B presents the same regression models from Table 4B but also includes the 
variable that measures the percentage of Latino teachers in a school district.  For most of these 
models, the NAEP score and the percentage Latino students who pass the given exam variables 
are statistically significant in the same way as in Table 4B’s models. 
 For half of the models, the Latino board representation variable is statistically significant 
and negatively associated with white student exam scores.  The percentage of Latino teachers 
variable are generally not statistically significant, and its coefficients are smaller in magnitude 
than the Latino board representation variable.  Therefore, H4 is not supported, but H2, that an 
 33 
increased percentage of Latino school board members would be negatively associated with white 
student achievement, is supported.  
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 Table 6 (A models) presents the regression models for SAT scores of Latino and white 
students.  It is important to note that the number of cases for all models using SAT scores does 
not exceed 31, which means that there are about 70% missing values.  Therefore, any findings or 
conclusions made from these are suggestive at best and should be interpreted with caution.  In 
both models, when white students get higher SAT scores, so do Latinos, and vice versa; this 
variable is statistically significant yet again.  Looking at the Latino model, it appears that there is 
a negative, although nowhere near statistically significant, association between Latino board 
representation and Latino SAT scores.  Therefore, H1 is not supported by these data.  
 The white model shows that there is support for H2.  In other words, there is a large, 
statistically significant, negative association between Latino board representation and white SAT 
score.  Given the strong correlation between Latino board representation and the percentage of 
Latino students, we would expect to see a large, statistically significant, and negative association 
between the percentage Latino students and white SAT scores.  In fact, we see a large, 
statistically significant, positive association between these two variables.  Substantively, a 1-
percentage point increase in Latino school board members is associated with a 141.5-point 
decrease in the average white SAT score.  Given that this mean score is out of 1600, this 
decrease is quite significant.  It is possible that with the addition of the percentage of Latino 
teachers variable, another variable highly associated with the two latter, this confusion will 
straighten itself out. 
 Table 6 (B models) presents the regression models for Latino and white SAT scores as in 
Table 6 (A models), but also includes a key independent variable: the percentage of Latino 
teachers.  The same control variables that were statistically significant in Table 6’s A models are 
still significant and with the same coefficient sign.  In this model, a 1-percentage point increase 
 36 
in Latino school board members is associated with a 186.2-point decrease in the average white 
SAT score and the Latino teachers variable has no significant impact on white average SAT 
scores. 
 As I hypothesized in H3, the Latino teachers variable does have a more substantial 
association with Latino SAT scores than does the Latino board representation variable.  
However, I actually find that the net effect of these two variables on Latino SAT scores is 
negative instead of positive.  For the white student model, I find that there is still a large, 
statistically significant, and negative association between the percentage of Latino school board 
members and white SAT scores.  H4 is not supported because the effect of Latino teachers on 
white SAT scores is small and insignificant.  However, like in Table 6 (A models) , H2 is 
generally supported. 
Table 6. The relationship between Latino representation and SAT scores
Dependent Variables: Average SAT score:
Independent variables
Latino SAT      
A
White SAT       
A
Latino SAT     
B
White SAT     
B
     Latino school board members (%) -11.99 -141.5* 15.35 -186.2*
(56.65) (76.13) (78.40) (105.3)
     Latino teachers (%) -30.67 57.49
(67.76) (96.56)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) -1.561*** 0.922 -1.616*** 1.022
(0.331) (0.625) (0.355) (0.667)
     Student-to-teacher ratio 5.275 -20.78* 3.084 -16.83
(8.234) (11.14) (9.055) (12.50)
     Latino students (%) -79.28 154.7** -84.23 158.6**
(48.05) (65.54) (51.00) (69.67)
     White or Latino student SAT scores 0.437*** 0.896*** 0.444*** 0.908***
(0.109) (0.223) (0.113) (0.230)
     (Constant) 504.8** 447.5 538.7** 363.2
(197.0) (304.2) (208.1) (329.6)
Adjusted R-squared 0.695 0.516 0.669 0.493
N 31 31 30 30
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Alternative Model Specification 
 After analyzing the models above, it seems somewhat counterintuitive that the presence 
of Latino school board members is negatively, even if not significantly, associated with Latino 
student achievement when accounting for the presence of Latino teachers as well.  As mentioned 
before, there is a high correlation of 0.8163 between the two Latino representation variables.  In 
addition, the percentage of Latino student variable is highly correlated with these two variables: 
0.7996 correlation with Latino board members and 0.7271 correlation with Latino teachers.  
Since I am distinguishing between the two types of representation in my analysis, it is not 
possible to combine or alter these variables.  Therefore, I decided to create an alternative model 
specification that includes all of the dependent and independent variables used in the previous 
models except for the percentage of Latino students. 
 Table 7 (A models) presents the relationship between Latino board representation only 
and graduation rates of both Latino and white students without account for Latino students.  This 
table is analogous to Table 2 (A models).  As before, the Latino board representation variable is 
almost statistically significant (p=0.136) in the Latino model, but the coefficient is about half of 
the previous value.  The most striking difference between the models is that the regression slope 
coefficient for the Latino board representation variable in the white model not only changed 
signs, but went from being large and very statistically significant to small and not at all 
significant.  It appears that the large and positive coefficient for the percentage of Latino students 
variable evident in Table 2 (A models) was absorbed by the Latino board representation variable 
in Table 7 (A models), causing this dramatic change.  These new findings would suggest that 
Latino board representation is associated with an increase in the Latino graduation rate and is not 
associated with the white graduation rate. 
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 Now we can look at Table 7 (B models), which presents the same model as the A models 
but also includes the Latino teacher representation variable.  Table 7 (B models) is similar to 
Table 2 (B models) for all of the variables except for Latino board representation.  With the 
percentage of Latino students in the model, the regression slope coefficient was negative for the 
Latino graduation rate and large and negative for the white graduation rate.  In Table 7 (B 
models), these coefficients change drastically.  The Latino model’s regression slope coefficient 
for board representation is now positive and larger in absolute value than before.  For the white 
model, the coefficient is now a relatively smaller negative number.  The latter change is likely 
caused by the removal of the Latino students variable, which was large, positive, and very 
significant before.  This provides suggestive evidence for collinearity between the Latino board 
representation and Latino student variables.  Although neither of these coefficients are 
statistically significant, the general trends support H1 and H2. 
Dependent Variables: Percentage of  students who:
Independent variables
Latino      
Graduate HS     
A
White       
Graduate HS     
A
Latino      
Graduate HS    
B
White       
Graduate HS   
B
     Latino school board members (%) 7.509 0.741 3.691 -5.902
(4.982) (4.313) (12.18) (11.61)
     Latino teachers (%) 7.171 5.581
(13.11) (12.53)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) -0.0172 -0.215*** -0.00836 -0.203***
(0.0621) (0.0471) (0.0810) (0.0713)
     Student-to-teacher ratio -0.653* -0.103 0.609 -0.433
(0.381) (0.331) (0.985) (0.942)
     White or Latino students who graduate (%) 0.750*** 0.546*** 0.671*** 0.612***
(0.102) (0.0743) (0.120) (0.109)
     (Constant) 19.55 56.32*** 4.364 56.28***
(13.59) (9.866) (19.44) (16.57)
Adjusted R-squared 0.542 0.622 0.489 0.541
N 83 83 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7. The relationship between Latino representation and graduation rates, without accounting for Latino students
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 Table 8 presents the models for Latino dropout rate as in Table 3 (A models), but these 
models do not include the Latino students control variable.  There is only one dramatic 
difference between these tables: the regression slope coefficient for the Latino board 
representation variable is larger and statistically significant, which it was not before.  The white 
model’s coefficient of the Latino board variable is still positive and near significant (p=0.179).  
Therefore, using the models presented in Table 8 (A models) show strong support for H1 and 
H2. 
 The B models of Table 8 are similar to the A models, but include the Latino teacher 
variable, and is analogous to Table 3 (B models).  There is no substantive difference between 
Tables 3 and 8’s B models, likely because the Latino student variable was not significant for 
either model in Table 3 (B models).  As before, the general trends, given the signs of the 
regression slope coefficients for the Latino board variable, suggest support for H1 and H2, but 
not for H3 and H4.	  
Dependent Variables: Percentage of  students who:
Independent variables
Latino 
Dropout A
White 
Dropout  A
Latino 
Dropout B
White 
Dropout B
     Latino school board members (%) -3.446* 2.161 -2.092 2.902
(1.794) (1.594) (1.929) (2.170)
     Latino teachers (%) 0.375 -1.353
(2.308) (2.606)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) -0.0358* 0.0520*** 0.00891 0.00419
(0.0183) (0.0153) (0.0137) (0.0156)
     Student-to-teacher ratio 0.0842 -0.0649 0.0329 -0.0527
(0.0868) (0.0763) (0.0590) (0.0665)
     White or Latino students who drop out (%) 0.933*** 0.719*** 0.818*** 1.048***
(0.0745) (0.0574) (0.0468) (0.0599)
     (Constant) 2.878 -2.316 0.779 -0.755
(1.795) (1.580) (1.261) (1.428)
Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.690 0.863 0.863
N 82 82 57 57
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8. The relationship between Latino representation and dropout rates, without accounting for Latino students
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 We can now turn to Table 9A, which presents the relationship between Latino board 
representation and state exam scores from grades 3-8 for both reading and math.  This table is 
analogous to Table 4A but has a few key differences.  First, in Table 9A, all but three regression 
slope coefficients for the board representation variable are positive, and three are significant and 
positive16.  In Table 4A’s model that included the percentage of Latino students, all but one 
coefficient was negative and none were significant.  I attribute these drastic differences to the 
Latino students variable in the first set of models, which was large, positive, and significant for 
about half of the student achievement measures.  With Table 9A, I therefore find modest support 
for H1, which I did not before with Table 4A. 
 I do not find as striking changes from Table 9B to Table 4B as I found from Table 9A to 
Table 4A.  Table 9B presents the same measures of student achievement as Table 9A, but with a 
focus on the relationship between Latino board representation and white student achievement.  
The Latino student variable was not significant in Table 4A, and we do not observe many 
changes in these new models without it.  The adjusted R2s are larger, the coefficient for grade 4 
math is now negative, and grade 6 math’s negative and statistically significant coefficient 
becomes larger and more significant than before.  Despite the lack of large differences, the 
model trends more towards supporting H2 than it did before.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The three significant coefficients include grade 4 math, which has a p-value of 0.175 and the two other 
measures marked as significant in the table. 
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 42 
 In Table 10A, we observe the relationship between the percentage of Latino students 
passing the various state exams and both variables of Latino representation.  Table 5A, the 
previous version of these models, had many positive, significant regression slope coefficients for 
the Latino student variable, so I would expect to see a change between these two models.  The 
alternative model shows an overall increase in the coefficient values for many of the Latino 
board and Latino teacher variables. All of these coefficients are still insignificant, but now the 
general trends indicate that both Latino board members and teachers have a positive affect on 
Latino student achievement, and sometimes the effect of Latino teachers is greater than that of 
the board members.  These findings provide weak support for H1 and H3. 
 Table 10B presents the relationship between Latino board and teacher representation and 
white student achievement on state exams without accounting for Latino students.  Table 10B is 
much like Table 9B in that the Latino students variable was not significant in the previous 
models in Table 5B, and therefore we do not observe much difference between these two 
models.  H2 is strongly supported by these Table 10B and Table 5B models, with all of the 
regression slope coefficients for Latino board representation being negative and about half 
statistically significant.  H4 is supported for only a couple of the twelve models but is otherwise 
not supported; the effect of Latino board members is stronger than Latino teachers when Latino 
students are not accounted for. 
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 Table 11 (A models) presents the relationship between Latino board representation and 
average SAT scores for both Latino and white students.  This table is very different from Table 6 
(A models), in which the same models are shown but with the Latino student variable.  In the 
Latino model, neither the Latino board representation nor the Latino students variable were 
significant before, but their effects compound into a large, negative, and significant effect on 
Latino mean SAT score.   Whereas H1 was weakly supported before, it is now strongly not 
supported.  In the white model, the regression slope coefficient for the Latino representation 
variable used to be large, negative, and significant but is now relatively much smaller, still 
negative, and insignificant.  Two variables that might be at work here are the student to teacher 
ratio, which is no longer significant, and the omission of the large, positive, and significant 
Latino student variable before.  H2 is no longer strongly supported when we omit the effect of 
Latino students.  
 Finally, Table 11 (B models) shows the same models as the A models but with the 
addition of the Latino teachers variable.  Looking at the Latino model, both of the coefficients 
for the Latino representation variables are more negative than before, although not significant.  It 
appears that the negative, insignificant Latino student variable coefficient from Table 6’s B 
model is absorbed by both representation variables.  In the white mode, the same difference 
between the coefficients for the Latino board variable occurs as in Table 11 (A models).  
Therefore, Table 11 (B models) does not find support for any of my hypotheses, whereas there 
was some support in Table 6’s B models.  However, as discussed in the first models using SAT 
scores as the dependent variable, I do not consider the findings of the SAT measure to be 
particularly accurate due to the small N size.  
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Dependent Variables: Average SAT score:
Independent variables
Latino SAT          
A
White SAT        
A
Latino SAT       
B
White SAT       
B
     Latino school board members (%) -87.98** -12.26 -55.56 -78.09
(34.06) (57.38) (67.92) (101.8)
     Latino teachers (%) -40.38 82.96
(69.89) (103.9)
Controls
     Free/Reduced-price lunch (%) -1.611*** 0.867 -1.627*** 0.879
(0.340) (0.677) (0.368) (0.719)
     Student-to-teacher ratio 0.407 -13.70 -1.605 -10.20
(7.938) (11.63) (8.902) (13.17)
     White or Latino student SAT scores 0.381*** 0.862*** 0.388*** 0.868***
(0.107) (0.242) (0.111) (0.249)
     (Constant) 615.3*** 427.7 643.5*** 360.6
(191.3) (329.7) (205.2) (357.1)
Adjusted R-squared 0.674 0.431 0.645 0.405
N 31 31 30 30
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11. The relationship between Latino  representation and SAT scores, without accounting for Latino students
 
 Overall, with the omission of the Latino students variable, there are significant changes in 
the models when that variable was large or significant or both in the previous models.  I find 
more support for all of my hypotheses than I did before with the exception of the SAT models 
from Tables 11.  Substantively, there is something larger at work here.  I present both versions of 
the models, with and without the Latino student variable, because there is a strong theoretical 
reason for including it but at the same time, there is strong quantitative support for removing it, 
as I discussed earlier in the paper. 
  
Discussion 
 After analyzing two different model specifications for many dependent variables, I can 
now draw overall conclusions about the relationship between Latino representation in school 
districts and both Latino and white student achievement.  H1 asserted that the presence of Latino 
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school board members is associated with higher levels of Latino student achievement.  This 
hypothesis was supported in the data by 4-year high school graduation rate, but not by dropout 
rate, the grades 3 through 8 math and reading exams, or SAT scores.  However, in the bar graphs 
of regression slope coefficients in Figure 3, we do see that there is a positive association between 
the presence of Latino school board members and state exam achievement, with no other 
variables being taken into account.  Therefore, H1 overall had, at best, only mixed support.  
 H2 posited that the presence of Latino school board members is negatively associated 
with white student achievement.  This hypothesis was mostly supported in all dependent 
variables, or measures of student achievement.  For dropout rate and state exam scores, this 
association is weak at best, but for graduation rate and SAT scores, the hypothesis is supported. 
 H3 supposed not only that the presence of Latino teachers is positively associated with 
Latino student achievement, but also that this presence diminishes the effect of Latino school 
board members’ presence.  This hypothesis is supported by the graduation rate measure and not 
supported by the dropout rate measure.  For state exam and SAT scores, the presence of Latino 
teachers was indeed positively associated with Latino student achievement, but its effect did not 
extend above and beyond the large, negative effect of Latino school board members. 
 Finally, H4 asserted that the presence of Latino teachers is negatively associated with 
white student achievement and diminishes the effect of Latino school board members’ presence. 
This hypothesis was rejected by the data for all measures of student achievement. In fact, the 
presence of Latino board members had a stronger association with white student achievement 
than the presence of Latino teachers.  And, the presence of Latino teachers was not negatively 
associated with this achievement, although the presence of Latino school board members was 
indeed negatively associated with all of the white student achievement measures.  
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 There are a couple alternative explanations for the results that must be accounted for in 
my models.  The first is that there are other factors that have significant influence on the 
relationship between Latino representation and student achievement.  More variables that control 
for a school district’s resources, such as teacher and administrator average salary or expenditures 
per pupil, could be included in subsequent models.  However, I not only controlled for school 
district resources by using student-to-teacher ratio, but I also controlled for poverty through the 
percentage of students who receive a free or reduced-price meal through a school lunch program. 
As minority students, or Latinos in this case, disproportionately live in poverty, this control is a 
key measure to ensure that my results are accurate. 
 The second main alternative explanation is that the presence of Latino board members 
and/or the presence of Latino teacher variables are picking up the effects of another variable that 
is really accounting for the variation in the measures of student achievement.  Such a variable 
might be whether the superintendent or principal is Latino.  Either of these could plausibly be 
highly correlated with the main independent variable and should therefore be included in the 
model to help account for variation in student achievement. 
 
Implications 
 Representative bureaucracy is offered as a partial solution for explaining the positive 
relationship between the presence of Latino school board members and certain measures of 
Latino student achievement.  The zero-sum problem, that having Latino students benefit from 
school board level representation would negatively impact white students, seems to be a an issue 
for the majority of the measures of student achievement.  The data show that with an increased 
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percentage of Latino school board members is associated with an increase in Latino student 
achievement, especially for elementary and middle school years. 
 While these findings are substantively and statistically significant, it is important to note 
their limitations.  This is a quantitative study of the 110 largest school districts in the nation, 
which might mean that the conclusions of the research only hold true for very large school 
districts.  Out of these 110 districts, I collected an incomplete dataset due to the variety district-
to-district in reporting student achievement.  This meant that at best, I had 92 out of 110 cases for 
my models, and often less17.  I was particularly constrained with SAT scores, in which I was only 
able to find 31 cases out of the 110 that reported the mean scores broken down by district and 
then by race.  In addition, the nature of quantitative analysis is that the data examines a wide 
breadth of cases but not any in depth.  
 Another major caveat is that the main independent variables I use are Latino 
representation at the district school board level and teacher level.  Many scholars have concluded 
that it is a mix of bureaucrats at the administration level that affect student achievement; 
therefore, it is likely that it is not the school board members and teachers alone who influence 
student achievement.  Future research should look at multiple levels of bureaucrats in schools—
such as principals and superintendents—and how their representation of race affects student 
achievement for students of that race, as Meier (1993) and Meier & O’Toole (2006) have done. 
 Future research on representative bureaucracy and student achievement could also vary 
the dependent variables more; measures such as taking AP courses, passing AP exams, and year-
to-year retention rate might all be metrics of student achievement that would be impacted by 
representation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 All N values have been included in the tables. 
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 In order to better student achievement for a minority group, that group should have racial 
representatives throughout the education sector, from the superintendent of a school system to 
the principal of a school to the teachers in the classrooms.  But, how would this work in the real 
world?  Does this mean that faculty should be hired based upon race quotas?  It is likely that the 
public and political elites would strongly push back against affirmative action hiring practices in 
American public schools. 
 An interesting finding that holds up for almost all of my models is that student-to-teacher 
ratio matters for Latino students but not so much for white students.  For most Latino-focused 
models, the regression slope coefficient for this variable, that is meant to measure school district 
resources, is negative and very significant.  The implications of this are two-fold.  First, it 
implies that Latino students perform better when there is a lower student-to-teacher ratio, 
possibly in an environment where they are able to get more one-on-one attention.  Given the 
extra challenges that Latino students face that their peer counterparts do not, this extra attention 
might be key to their academic success.  Second, it suggests that a school with more resources, 
that would have fewer students per teacher in a classroom, would benefit Latino students.  White 
students do not appear to be impacted by student-to-teacher ratio or school district resources at 
all.  This finding suggests that a policy solution that would not hurt white students and would 
significantly help Latino students is to put additional aides in a classroom with Latino students or 
have smaller class sizes in schools where there is a Latino student population.  There are clearly 
resource constraints to this policy solution, but it may be one of the only policy solutions that 
does not result in a zero-sum situation. 
 However, since much my data concluded that Latino representation is often negatively 
associated with white student achievement, a larger policy solution becomes even more 
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complicated.  Future research could investigate more about why having minorities represented 
would negatively impact whites to see if there is some middle-ground in which Latino students 
can be positively impacted without whites being negatively impacted.  It is important and 
necessary to investigate the policy solutions that could improve Latino student achievement as 
the number of these students in US public schools increases dramatically over the next couple 
decades. 
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